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This ends the catechism, and, as a result of the whole, the court
instruct you that if you believe the testimony submitted to you by
the plaintiff, he is entitled to your verdict, notwithstanding any
testimony produced by defendant, and the many legal objections so
ingeniously and ably urged.
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1. All trusts depend much upon the implications growing out of the state of the
property, the purposes desired to be accomplished, and the mode provided for
that end.
2. This is true, to a great extent in regard to all contracts. It is only by means
of the constructive additions and limitations imposed by courts, that a brief memorandum of a contract is ever made to speak truly and fully the mind of the
parties.
3. But upon no subject is there so much demand for the exercise of construction,
and of judicial implications, as in regard to trusts ; and especially trusts of a
complicated and public character. And these are not less a part of the contract
than its most express provisions.
4. All corporate action, as well that of the directors and agents, as of the corporation itself, is but a succession of trusts, in regard to which the creditors of the
corporation, in the order of their priority, are the primary, and the shareholders
the ultimate cestuis que trust.
5. The trust imposed upon the trustees in the first instance, and before foreclosure,
is fiduciary and active.
6. After the foreclosure, and until the cestuis que trust are in a condition to act for
themselves, the trustees are bound to control and manage the property, in the
best mode for all concerned.
7. After the surrender of a railroad to the trustees upon the forfeiture, and before
foreclosure, and while that state of the property might fairly be presumed to be
but temporary, the trustees could not be expected to surrender the trust to the
cestuis que trust.
8. And after the foreclosure, the necessity of action is so pressing and the difficulty and consequent delay so great, in effecting any legitimate action of the
cestuis que trust, that there seems an absolute necessity for the trustees continuing the management of the property for the time being and until it can properly be taken into custody of the cestuis que trust.
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9. The mode of management must be such as a prudent and experienced owner
would adopt under the circumstances of the case.
10. In this case, the trustees having no rolling stock and no means of purchasing
any, could not be expected to attempt operating the road on their own account,
except as matter of strict necessity, and when it was practicable.
11. As they had the opportunity of leasing rolling stock for this road, or leasing
their property to a connecting road, thy might fairly decide between these
modes. And having made a short experiment of hirink rolling stock, and experienced a serious loss for the time, it was natural and proper to effect a lease with
a connecting road.
12. This they did in a reasonable and prudent manner, as it seems to us.
13. The term being absolutely for one year, with the right to allow it to extend to
ten years, if no notice to the contrary were given, was all that could be desired
on the part of the lessors.
14. The rent was favorable, and the clause for renewals and repairs being such as
is necessary to maintain the works in proper condition for use, "natural wear
only excepted," was all that could be expected or desired.
15. The statute ofthis State enabling our roads to lease to roads connecting with them
at the line of the State, and those interested in the Troy and Boston Company not
objecting to the lease, and the State of New York having taken no measures to
avoid the contract or interfere with that company on that account, the plaintiffs
cannot object to the supposed want of authority in the lessees.
16. The lease cannot be avoided on the part of the lessors or those they represented,
on the ground of any informality in its terms or unreasonableness in its provisions, unless a case is shown of want of power, that the contract is ultra vires.

The bill in this case, was brought in the Court of Chancery, for
the County of Bennington, in the State of Vermont. Its object was
to set aside a lease of the Western Vermont Railroad, executed in
January, 1857, by the trustees of the first mortgage thereon, to the
Troy & Boston Railroad Company. The mortgage was given by
the Western Vermont Railroad Company in 1851, to Shepherd
Knapp and George Briggs, of New York, as trustees, to secure the
payment of the bonds of that Company to the amount of $400,000,
and the interest thereon. It covered the road and the franchise of
the corporation. But the mortgage deed, which was in common
form, contained no provision in reference to foreclosure, or possession of the road by the mortgagees, nor as to the rights or duties of
the trustees in the event of foreclosure. In September, 1854, the
interest on the bonds being in arrear, the trustees, at the instance
of bondholders, commenced a suit in chancery in Vermont, to foreclose the mortgage. Pending this suit, a motion was made by the
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trustees for the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the
road, and an order was finally entered by consent of the parties,
appointing Mr. Knapp receiver, and Myron Clark, (who was a lessee
of the road under the corporation, and a party to the suit,) agent of
the receiver, to run the road and account for the profits. Under
this arrangement, Mr. Clark occupied the road during the pendency
of the suit, and until the expiration of the decree, employing for that
purpose rolling stock owned by Jonathan Sturges, Thos. Douglass,
and himself, for the use of which, rent was paid out of the earnings
of the road. In June 1855, the trustees obtained a decree of foreclosure, which provided for the payment of the arrears of interest
then due within one year, and of the subsequently accruing instalments of the principal and interest of the bonds, within one year
from the time they respectively fell due. And in the event of the
non-payment of any of the instalments within the time limited by
the decree, that the title to the road and franchise should become
absolute in the trustees, in trust for the bondholders. This decree
was in accordance with the general provisions of the law of Vermont,
on the subject of mortgages. The first instalment under the decree,
amounting to about $16,000, was paid. The second, amounting to
about 124,000, was not paid, and on the 1st day of January, 1857,
the title became absolute in the trustees by operation of the decree.
On the 16th day of January, 1857, the trustees executed to the
Troy & Boston Railroad Company the following lease, and placed
them in possession under it:
" THIS INDENTURE, executed on the 16th day of January, 1857, between Shepherd
Knapp, and George Briggs, trustees of the first mortgage on the Western Vermont
Railroad in the State ofVermont on the one part, and the Troy & Boston Railroad Co.,
on the other part, witnesseth: That the said trustees hereby lease and demise to
said company for the period of ten years from and including this date, subject to
the conditions hereinafter expressed, the said Western Vermont Railroad as located
and heretofore occupied under the charter of the Western Vermont Railroad Company, with all the buildings, privileges, and appurtenances thereto belonging, and
the full right to hold, use, and operate the same in conformity with said charter,
together with all the tools, implements and furniture belonging to said trustees, and
-now on or about said road, and used for operating or repairing the same.
And the said company hereby covenant and agree with the said trustees, to pay
them as rent for said road and property, the sum of twenty.five hundred dollars per
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month, for the first year of said lease, and the sum of three thousand dollars per
month, during all the succeeding years thereof in the manner following; The rent
for that portion of the month of January included in said lease, and the rent for the
month of February, 1857, to be paid on the first day of February, 1857, and the
rent for the succeeding months during the continuance of this lease, to be paid in
advance on the first day of the month.
And it is hereby mutually agreed, that in case of failure on the part of said company to make any of said monthly payments of rent, to said trustees, within ten days
after the same becomes due as aforesaid, said trustees shall have the right forthwith
to determine this lease and to re-enter upon, and take and retain possession of said
railroad and property without legal process.
And said company further covenant and agree with said trustees, to return said
road and property, both real and personal, at the termination of this lease, in as
good condition and repair in all respects as it now is in, natural wear only excepted.
And it is agreed that Charles Linsley, of Rutland, Vermont, and either one of the
present Railroad Commissioners of the State of New York, provided his attendance
shall upon reasonable application be procured by said company, shall pass over and
examine said railroad and property as soon hereafter as the state of the weather
and the season render it practicable, and make an examination as to the condition
and state of repairs of the same. And that upon the termination of this lease, from
any cause, the same parties or the survivor of them, if either is living and where his
attendance can be made, shall make a like examination for the purpose of determining whether said road and property are in the condition and state of repair
required by this agreement, and if not, to appraise the difference in value. The
decision so made to be final between said company and said trustees.
And it is hereby further understood and agreed that this lease is made subject to
the following condition: That if a majority in amount of the bondholders under
said first mortgage upon said road, shall, within ninety days from the date hereof,
unite in giving a notice in writing to said company of their desire to terminate this
lease at the expiration of one year from the date hereof, then said lease shall so
terminate, and shall stand valid between the parties only as a lease for one year
from the date hereof, subject however to the provisions of this indenture.
And it is hereby further agreed, that nothing herein contained shall be construed
as creating any persoial liability whatsoever on the part of said trustees or of the
directors of said company, either for a failure from whatever cause in the performance of any of the stipulations of this indenture, expressed or implied or any other
matter or thing arising from, or in consequence of this indenture in any manner
whatever.
In testimony whereof, said parties have hereunto affixed their names and
seals.
JOHN J. LATTINO,

SHEPHERD KNAPP,

[L. S.]

IsAAC V. BAKER,

Go a

[L. S.]

BRInGsS,
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The Troy & Boston Railroad Company, by D. Thomas Vail their President, duly
authorized by said company to execute this indenture in their behalf, and to affix
their corporation seal thereto.
[L. S.]
D. THOMAS VAIL,
President Troy & Boston Railroad Co."

Under this lease the T. & B. R. R. Co. occupied the road until
May, 1857, paying the rent and complying with the stipulations
which it contained; meanwhile Johnathan Sturges and two others,
claiming to act as a "1Committee of Bondholders," served upon the
Troy and Boston Railroad Company the following paper:
"To the Troy and Boston Railroad Company:
The subscribers, a committee appointed by, and representing persons and firms
constituting a majority in interest of the cestuis gue trust interested in the railroad
and property mortgaged by the Western Vermont Railroad Company to secure
bonds issued pursuant to resolutions of the said company, of January 7th 1851,
under and by virtue of the foreclosure of the said mortgage, hereby inform you that
they have heard that Shepherd Knapp and George Briggs, the trustees named in the
said mortgage, have executed a lease of the said railroad and property to you, by
an instrument dated January 16th, 1857.
They further inform you, that the said Shepherd Knapp and George Briggs had
no power or right to make such lease, or any lease or disposition of the said railroad and property, except a transfer to the cestuds gue trust, or to such persons as
they might designate, and that such lease and disposition is absolutely illegal, null
and void, and that they repudiate and disaffirm the same, and will hold you as trespassers. and responsible for all injuries or loss they may sustain, in consequence of
your using the said railroad.
JONATHAN STUnGES,
JAMES L. STARK, JR.,
THOMAS DOUGLASS,

Committee of Bondholders."

And this bill was soon after brought in the names of Messrs.
Sturges and Douglass as against the trustees of the T. & B. R. R.
Co., claiming that the lease should be set aside, and a conveyance
of the road and franchise from the trustees to the bondholders
directed.
On filing the bill, an application was made to Judge Kittridge,
then of the Vermont Supreme Court, for an injunction to put the
T. & B. R. R. Co., out of possession, and for a receiver to run the
road pending the suit. The motion was based on the alleged want
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of authority in the trustees to make the lease, and upon the furthei
allegation, that the T. & B. Co., were permitting the road to get
out of repair, and had failed to keep up the connections which the
interest and business of the road required. The T. & B. R. R. Co.,
and the trustees separately answered the bill, and opposed the
motion for an injunction, claiming that the trgustees had full power
to make, and the T. & B. Co., to take the lease, and explicitly
denying all the allegations in the bill in regard to the omission to
repair the road, or to keep up its proper connections. They also
filed a large number of affidavits disproving these allegations in
support of which no proof was given by the complainants. And
insisted that even if the title to the property was doubtful, no injunction to change possession pending a suit to determine it, should be
granted, when it appeared that the road was meanwhile in safe and
proper hands, was paying an ample and well secured rent, and
being kept in sufficient repair and preservation, and that no danger
existed of immediate injury to the property or loss to those interested.
The injunction was however granted, and C. M. Davy, was placed
in possession of the road, as receiver, pending the suit.
A pro forma decree having been entered in favor of the complainants, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. The cause was
argued at Bennington, in February 1858 before REDFIELD, Ch. J.
and BENNETT, POLAND and BARRETT, Justices, by Messrs. William
Tracy, Edwin Edgerton and Harmon Canfield, for the complainants,
John S. Robinson and Charles Linsly for the T. & B. R. R. Co.,
and E. J. Phelps, for the trustees, representing a portion of the
bondholders. And by direction of the court was again argued at
Burlington, in July, 1858, by the same counsel, before the same
judges and also judges Aldis and Pierpont, the remaining members
of the court. The points discussed will sufficiently appear from
the opinion of Chief Justice Redfield.
Judge BARRETT dissented from the opinion of the court. And Judge
Bennett dissented from so much of it as affirmed the right of the
trustees to make a lease for so long a period as ten years, but concurred on the other points; and in the judgment.
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William Tracy, Edwin Edgerton, and Harmon Ganfield, solicitors for Sturges and Douglass.
-. J. Phelps, solicitor for Knapp and Briggs.
Bobinson & Sibley, Linsley J-Prout,PierpontIs am, solicitors
for the Troy and Boston Railroad Company.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
REDFIDLD, C. J.-This bill is brought by the plaintiffs holding
a majority in amount, of the bonds, secured by the mortgage of the
Western Vermont Railway, executed to Knapp and Briggs, as trustees for the holders of the bonds-praying a decree, that Knapp and
Briggs, after the foreclosure of the mortgage, held no estate in the
premises conveyed, except a mere nominal, naked, or dry trust, for
the sole benefit of the cestuis que trust. In other words, that the
trust did not impose any functions or duties whatever, except to
convey the estate to the cestuis que trust; that it was a naked use
of the character, which the statute of Henry VIII. would have executed, without the formality of a conveyance: And as a consequence,
thereof, that the contract of lease, made by Knapp and Briggs to
the Troy and Boston Railway Co., may be declared void, and an
account taken of the profits made by the railway company, a receiver
appointed, and the sum found due, decreed to the plaintiffs and their
associates.
1. The first, and the great inquiry in the case is in regard to
the nature of the estate in the trustees, created by the mortgage,
the forfeiture, and the foreclosure.
It is obvious that the estate must depend very much upon the implications growing out of the relations of the parties, and the duties
consequent thereon; and that these may change, from time to time,
as circumstances change. That which begins as an active, responsible, fiduciary trust, may by lapse of time, and intervening relations,
become merely a naked, dry trust, and vice versa. The nature and
character of all trusts depend, almost exclusively, upon the implications growing out of the state of the property, the purposes desired
to be accomplished, and the mode provided for that end. And it is
one of the most important, and at the same time, one of the moat
14
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delicate and difficult offices of a court of equity, to raise these implications, with wisdom and justice, so that the full purpose and object
of the trust shall be effected, without violence, or forced construction
of the instrument under which the trusts are created.
All contracts are, more or less, subject to implications, constructive additions, and implied limitations. These are the powers, by
which courts, in matters of contract, are enabled to make a brief
memorandum, which does not express one-tenth part of what is intended, speak truly, and fully, the mind of the parties. These limitations and implications must indeed be conceived, in the spirit of
liberal, wise, and farsighted circumspection, or they will be liable to
become a terror to all just sense of uprightness and fair dealing.
Herein consists the power and the wisdom of courts of justice in the
administration of civil jurisprudence, in making shreds and fragments,
and even fineness and indirection sometimes, subserve the ends of fair
dealing and justice. It is to be expected that some cynical sneers
will sometimes be heard with reference to these implications and
constructive additions, both as to contracts and statutes, either in
more or less of the spirit of seriousness and complaint, or of badinage and pleasantry, or both perhaps. But still the process must
go on, so long as human imperfection, and cultivated society, with
its manifold and complicated relations, continue the same they now
are. It is impossible but that every case, which occurs in a court
of justice, should give occasion for the exercise of something of this
function of judicial construction.
But upon no subject is there so much demand for the exercise of
construction, and of judicial implications, as in regard to trusts, and
especially trusts of this complicated and public character. And
these implications and constructive additions, are not the less a part
of the contract than its most express provisions.
There are extensive trusts connected with the whole subject of
corporate action, which come under the class of, what in the books,
are denominated constructive or implied trusts. In one sense the
corporation itself is a mere trustee, holding all its funds, and all its
powers and franchises, in trust for the shareholders, who are the
ultimate cestuis que trust. So too, the directors of a corporation
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are mere trustees, holding their office, and performing their functions,
strictly as trustees, for the benefit of the shareholders ultimately,
and directly, and primarily of all having claims against the company.
The persons to whom these mortgage bonds are payable, have
not only the express trusts to perform, which are created. by the
terms of the deeds, under which they are made trustees, but they
are also constructively trustees, (after the forfeiture, and taking
possession of the road, which they may always do, after condition
broken,) for subsequent incumbrancers, for the corporation, and
ultimately for the shareholders themselves.
But it is not with these classes of constructive or implied trusts,
that we are chiefly, at present concerned. It is with the express
trusts, created by the terms of the deed, when construed and
expounded, by the attending circumstances, and the reasonable
implications and necessary limitations, with which we have to do at
present.
We could not of course go much into detail here, upon so extensive a subject as that of the construction of powers, and executory,
or active trusts. The books are filled with cases of this class, involving interests of the greatest magnitude, and where the terms of the
deeds or instruments, by which the trusts were attempted to be
created, were deficient in all specific definition of the purposes
expected to be accomplished, and especially, in regard to the mode
of its accomplishment. In all these cases the courts of equity have
not scrupled to carry out the apparent purpose of the contract, in
the mode most consonant with the terms used, as interpreted by the
known and obvious rules of construction. We shall not stop to discuss a class of cases, so numerous, and all tending to the same result,
the accomplishment of the apparent and obvious purposes of the
contract. We proceed at once to the consideration of the nature of
the trust created in the case before us.
And it will scarcely require distinct enunciation here, that in
entering upon a subject so new, so difficult, and where the consequences of mistake are likely to be of such importance to the State
and its citizens, we have attempted to proceed with reasonable caution and circumspection; and at the same time fairly to meet the
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emergency, without shrinking from its weight or responsibility;
deeming it of the last moment, that upon such a subject we start, if
possible, in the right direction, and with a just comprehension of the
interests at stake.
We think it could scarcely escape the notice of any one, who had
seriously and patiently attempted to master this question, that until
the actual foreclosure of the mortgage, the trusts involved in the
contract and imposed upon the trustees named are entirely fiduciary
and executory. At first, and so long as prompt payment is made,
it is understood, in practice indeed, that the office of such trustees
is rather silent, and the duties of the trustees, by means of the
negotiability of the bonds, and of the coupons attached, are ordinarily performed, or expected to be performed, by the corporation
or its officers. If the interest on the coupons and the principal, as
it falls due, are promptly paid by the corporation, so that no
forfeiture occurs, it will never become of sufficient importance to
consider the question, what is the precise nature of the trust created
by the contract in the first instance.
But after the forfeiture occurs, either by non-payment of interest,
or principal, or both, as in the present case, the duties of the trustees
become, not only active and responsible, but critical and delicate.
It not only is not a dead, dry trust, but is one of the most active
and momentous responsibility. We presume no man who had ever
been placed in such position, and who had any proper sense of his
position, would ever think of regarding or treating it as in any
sense a trust of a nominal or indifferent character. It is not a dry
trust, at this point certainly, or if so, it is not, in the sense of the
books; if so in any sense, it is not so in regard to its duties or
responsibilities.
The trustees must then elect between delay and action; and in
action, between taking possession of the road and its fixtures, and
thereby assuming at once the vast public and private burdens and
responsibilities of a great public work, forming a necessary link in
some great thoroughfare, perhaps; or delay, and consequent further
embarrassment, complication and loss; or, the ulterior and final
remedy of foreclosure. And those persons, if any such there be,
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who could regard the discharge of such a trust, to be exercised in
the face of such alternatives, as any formal or nominal affair, have
certainly yet much to learn in regard to the nature of this business.
For at this point, it will not be assumed, or has not been, in argument even, that the trustees could have surrendered the trust to the
cestuis que trust, or that they were in any condition to obtain counsel from them. It was the sole, or the first purpose of their office,
that they should act, and should exercise their wisdom and discretion,
upon the possible occurrence of this very emergency. They were
selected doubtless, with reference to their capacity and responsibility,
for this very contingency, both by the corporation and the cestuis
que trust, and neither of these parties had stipulated to deal directly
with the other, but only with the trustees, as the responsible party.
This duty they must meet and perform. This they did do.
The next inquiry is, whether their functions ceased upon the foreclosure ? When we look at the position of affairs at this time, it
seems difficult to come to any such conclusion. The powers and
duties of the corporation in regard to the road and its franchises,
under such a mortgage and foreclosure, must be regarded as effectually
terminated for all practical purposes. The trustees and the cestuis
que trust, one or both, had effectually become the corporation, or
had acquired all its essential rights, and assumed all its duties, so
far as the public was concerned. And these were important and
pressing. Delay for the shortest interval might be attended with
disastrous consequences to the continuance of the franchise even,
and must be so, in every view, to the interest of the cestuis que
trust. The road could not, in strict propriety, be allowed to stop
for a single day; and it could not be allowed to cease operation for
any considerable time, with any safety to the interests of those to
be affected by the depreciation of the property, and the intervention
of counter interests and influences.
The cestuis que trust, the holders of these bonds, were a changing, unorganized body, having no common bond of union, and no
recognized principle of action, unless by unanimity of consent, which
is practically impossible. It would not be expected, under such
circumstances, that there should be an immediate surrender of the
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property to this heterogeneous and chaotic mass of men, women,
(single or married,) and infants, many of whom were under such
disabilities that they could not act for themselves, and where consequent delay must ensue in providing means of obtaining their consent in a legal form, which must be fatal to the enterprise. All this
must be regarded as in the contemplation of the parties, at the time
of entering into the contract, by which the bonds were issued. It
must be so regarded in looking for the true construction of the contract, for in that we are attempting to obtain the mind and will of
the parties, at the time of making the contract, in regard to the state
of facts, which has now intervened; and it will, perhaps, fairly test
this, to ask ourselves, what would have been their probable response,
had the inquiry then been put to the parties; what shall be done
with this property, and how shallit be managed, in case of foreclosure?
Shall the trustees continue to manage it for the time being, and until
the order of the court of chancery, as in the case of other trusts?
It seems to us there can be but one response to this question. The
trustees seem to have been selected for this very office, among others,
of controlling and managing the property, in case of forfeiture and
surrender, as trustees, for the benefit of the cestuis que trust, in
order to make it available to the payment of the bonds, both interest
and principal. This must be so, until some organization of the
bondholders, and the acquiring of some capacity to act, by a majority,
or in some such way, as to enable them to discharge this new class
of duties thrown upon them, by the forfeiture of the condition of the
mortgage, and the surrender of the road with its incidents and fixtures.
After the surrender and before foreclosure, as we have before
intimated, while the control of the road, for the benefit of the bondholders, might fairly be presumed to be temporary, it could not, with
any the least show of propriety be expected that any change in the
principle of their mode of action should be attempted. Any one
who accepted the office of trustee, under a contract of this character,
must be supposed to look directly at the reasonable probability of
the occurrence of this contingency, the failure to pay promptly, and
to have assumed his position with reference to the new duties result-
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ing from the occurrence of such contingency, and would consequently
be bound to perform the duties arising from it. And all the other
parties in interest, the bondholders, the creditors of the corporation,
in the order of their priority, the corporation itself, and ultimately
the shareholders will have a vested interest in having these duties
performed by such trustees, under the security of their responsibility
and capacity, both pecuniary and personal. "And we do not well
perceive how they can be relieved from this responsibility, except
by the decree of the court of chancery, who alone has the legitimate control over such matters.
And it is well settled, in the court of chancery, that trustees are
not to be removed, or discharged, from part of their trust, leaving
them burthened with, and responsible for the remainder. Goodson
vs. Bllison, 3 Russ. 594. Nor will such a trust be discharged until
fully performed, or the cestuis que trust are in a condition to manage
it themselves. Nor will trustees be changed except for sufficient
cause, affecting the faithfulness and capacity of the trustees or the
interest of the cestuis que trust, or perhaps on account of the public
interest, which is extensively concerned in trusts of this character.
These are but elementary principles in the law of trusts, familiar to
every one the least conversant with the subject, and will be found
distinctly laid down in the elementary treatises, upon the subject.
And a trustee, once having assumed the office, is morally and
legally bound to continue in the performance of its duties, until
discharged by the order of the court of chancery, or the unanimous
consent of the cestuis que trust, which in a case of this kind, where
there are of necessity always more or less, of infants, married women,
and others under disabilities incapacitating them to act personally,
or in any way effectually, except through the guardianship of the
court of chancery, is morally impossible, and practically so except
through the agency of a court of equity.
So that before the actual foreclosure of the mortgage, there can
be no question whatever, that the trustees are the only responsible
party, in regard to the management of the property.
And after the foreclosure, it seems to us, that although the contingent interests are mostly cut off, and the number and character
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of the ultimate cestuis que trust very much changed, (reduced in
number, and simplified, in regard to their interests,) that the.duties
of the trustees and the necessity of their continuing to act, remain
much the same.
The necessity of immediate and efficient action is precisely the
same, and so is the difficulty or impossibility of it being effected
through the cestuis *quetrust; and the utter ruin to the interests
at stake, in consequence of any considerable delay, are none the less
imminent. There would therefore seem to be a duty remaining in
the trustees, to manage the property for the benefit of the cestuis
que trust. And this duty is to be estimated by the surrounding
circumstances, and what a prudent owner would esteem reasonable,
under these circamstances. We do not say they are to perform
this duty permanently, but they must do it until they can be legally
exonerated.
IL And this duty must be performed in a manner to meet all the
incidents of the case; taking into account the nature of the property,
the public demands upon those who operate the road, and the duty
of securing the greatest permanent return to the cestuis que trust.
And not only the nature of the property, but the extent of the equipment included in the mortgage and which comes to the trustees,
must be considered.
We have then, in the present case:
1. An entire road of more than fifty miles in length with no
adequate equipment whatever. And if the equipment were perfect,
it is questionable how far the trustees are bound to assume the burden of personally operating the road, or its responsibility, farther
than results necessarily from the legal title being in them, and the
public having no other party to look to in the first instance. But
as they had no equipment in this case, it would not be expected
they should attempt to purchase one. Under such circumstances
we might expect prudent managers to look, either to a lease, to
some party owning a road in connection, and having sufficient rolling
stock to operate both roads ; or to some other party, having rolling
stock, whose use could be- secured, at a reasonable rate. Both
modes, last named, were practicable, in the present case. But it
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would seem, that which the trustees elected was preferable, as
imposing less risk and promising more return, especially after the
short experiment, made -by the trustees, of attempting to operate
the road, by means of agents, with hired rolling stock, which produced a loss of some thousands of dollars, in a few days.
2. This road was part of an important thoroughfare in the state,
affecting transportation and travel to a large extent, thereby making
it the duty of the public authorities to insist upon the strict and
faithful performance of its public functions and duties. There were
also, rival lines of transportation and travel, whereby it became
important to the interests of the cestuis que trust, that the operation
of the road should not be suspended for any the shortest period of
time; which would destroy confidence in its permanent efficiency
and produce a diversion of traffic which could not fail to be seriously
injurious to the interests of the cestuis que trust.
3. It was a species of property which could only be made remunerative, by placing large interests, and long lines of communication
as far as practicable, under unity of control, and management.
4. They could not consult the entire body of cestuis que trust,
and their duty being due to the body severally, they were not at
liberty to follow the advice or wishes of the majority, as they were
still liable to the minority for faithful administration. And in showing this, the advice of the majority would be no more conclusive, in
their favor, than that of others, equally skilled and equally interested
in the question. Having assumed the duty of faithful administration
of the trust, on behalf of the several owners of the bonds, they were
not at liberty to shield themselves by anything short of showing the
fact of such administration, oi that they were excused, by the owners,
unanimous consent, from the performance of their duty under the
trust.
5. They must act without delay, and under the responsibility of
being made liable for a breach of trust, if they failed to act in time,
or to act, with proper discretion, wisdom and forecast.
6. It was a trust of a character so entirely new, that very little
light could be gained, from any analogy to other trusts. Even the
right of the trustee of real estate, held for the support and benefit
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of the cestuis que trust, where the right to lease for twenty-one
years, or even for a much longer term, is unquestionable, could
afford no satisfactory guide in a case like the present. There is a
very essential difference between land and buildings, even where
comparatively small repairs are required to maintain them in tenantable condition; and a railway, where heavy expenditures are requisite, from day to day. So that the powers and duties of trustees,
in regard to lands and buildings and other real estate of that kind,
are not in any just sense a guide for trustees of the character now
under consideration.
Under all these circumstances the question presents itself, as it
occurred to the mind of the trustees, at the moment of the foreclosure. They would naturally try, as they did, the temporary
expedient of operating the road on their own account, if the thing
were practicable, as the test of this mode of administering the trust.
This we think proved so disastrous, that the trustees ought not
longer to have continued it, if any mode presented itself, whereby
they could exempt themselves from loss, and especially if gain could
be secured. The leasing the property to some connecting road was
obviously the most hopeful expedient, practicable.
And it seems to us that the rent secured in the present case is
quite as good as could reasonably have been expected. The wonder
is that the Troy and Boston Company could afford to pay so high
a rent. The other conditions of the contract are not objected to,
-with the exception of two.
1. The provision in regard to repairs and renewals. This it seems
to us, must be regarded as sufficient. We are to understand this
provision, as we Qo all the provisions of this, and of all contracts,
with reference to the general purposes and objects of the contract,
and what it is reasonable and natural to expect under it. We are
not to suppose that the lessees will cease operating the road during
the whole or any considerable portion of the term, and then pay the
rent and perform the covenant in regard to repairs. The very
supposition is little short of absurdity. It could not be done short
of renewing the entire perishable portion of the superstructure of
the road. The covenant is, that the lessees shall "1return said road
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and property, both real and personal, at the termination of this
lease, in as good condition and repair, in all respects as it now is in,
natural wear only excepted."
This covenant, construed with reference to the subject matter of
the contract and its other stipulations, imports that the road is to
be kept in good running condition during the term and returned in
that condition. And all structures which by decay, or accident,
become unsafe for use, must be renewed, at the expense of the lessees.
This, every one conversant with the subject must understand is a
very onerous covenant, and one which secures to the lessees all that
could be asked or desired.
2. The length of the term is objected to. But with the condition
for defeasance, which this lease contains, enabling the parties in
interest, a majority in amount of the bondholders, to terminate it,
in one year, by notice to that effect, we cannot regard the length of
the term, ten years, as being unreasonable. It is well known that a
favorable lease, for a much shorter term, could not reasonably have
been expected to be offered by any connecting road. Itrequires a considerable time to bring these extensive works into such a train of
operation, as to be made remunerative. Experienced directors
would not venture upon a term which, if it went beyond a few months,
did not extend over a considerable number of years. And as this
is a case where there is no reasonable probability that the bondholders
would attempt to operate the road themselves, without an essential
modification of their principle of action, through some definite organization, which could not speedily be effected, as the law then stood,
certainly, it would seem that the contract secured to them all that
was desirable in regard to the shortness of the term. A longer term
would in fact, no doubt, have been far better, than a shorter one,
for the interest of the cestuis que trust.
Taking the contract, all in all, and the circumstances of the
property, there has never been any question, in our minds, that the
contract must be regarded, as a provident one, a very derirable one
for the cestuis que trust. And if it were less so we know of no
principle of chancery law, by which it could be set aside in a court
of equity, upon any such grounds, short of making a case, when the
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lessors had exceeded their powers, in assuming to enter into the
contract.
It seems to be now well settled in the English courts, that railway
contracts, and indeed, all contracts by corporations, are not to be
held invalid for any omission in the detail of preliminary proceedings, or in the provisions of the contract, unless the contract itself
was ultra vires. In such case where the lessor has not the power
to enter into the contract of lease, and the extent of such power is
open equally to the knowledge of both parties, the lessee is bound to
know the fact, and it is regarded as virtually bad faith to accept a
contract where the other contracting party acted in a fiduciary
relation, and which he had no power to execute. And it is upon
this ground that the plaintiff proceeds, both in the bill and the argument, and we regard it as the only ground upon which the plaintiff's
case can be supported.
The proposition of the want of power in the lessees to accept of
such a lease, which has been so much labored in argument, does not
seem to us available on the part of the orators. The defendants, and
their creditors, and shareholders, have and do acquiesce in the contract. It is one which, by the express provisions of our statutes, it
is competent for those having the control of Vermont railways to
make with railways out of the State connecting at the line of the
State with such roads. And as it is a vexed question among those
learned in the laws of New York, how far the statutes of that State
have authorized the defendants, the Troy and Boston Company, to
accept such contract, we think it is not competent for the plaintiffs to
claim any advantage on this ground, until the State of New York,
or those interested in the Troy & Boston Railway, interfere. This
principle has been repeatedly recognized in this State by this court.
Noyes vs. Rut. & Bur. Railway, 27 Vt. R. 110. But. & Bur.
Railway vs. Proctor, 29 Vt. R. 93.
In regard to the validity of the mortgage, nothing need be said.
Both parties claim under it, and consequently, are not in a position
to raise that question ; and if they were, it would not seem there
could be much question in regard to it.
The view we have taken of the case renders it unnecessary to
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examine the other points raised in argument. Neither are we called
upon at this time to give any intimation in regard to the action of
the majority in amount of the bondholders, and whether it had the
effect to terminate the lease. This bill was brought before the first
year terminated, and does not of course base itself upon such ground.
We could therefore only decide the case upon the grounds made in
the bill, and other pleadings.
It will be perceived that the lease in this case was made before
any statute existed in this State enabling the bondholders to organize
themselves into a corporation, which will apply of course to contracts
made after the law came in force; and we do not intend to intimate
any opinion here how it might have affected the present case had it
existed at the time of the foreclosure. The lease containing a power
of revocation during the first year, by which its operation was limited
to one year,-if this power thus reserved to the bondholders was not
exercised, it was of course by their own acquiescence and consent
that the lease was extended beyond one year. And if that power
was exercised, the lease was in effect a lease for but one year.
It may be proper to add, that if the contract in this case had contained no condition -whereby it could have been terminated by the
legal agency of the cestuis que trust in some short but reasonable
period at the beginning of the term of lease, we probably might
have regarded the lease as somewhat more questionable, so far as the
power of the trustees is concerned. It is certain such a clause of
revocation was highly prudent and proper, and the lease without
this provision would wear a very different aspect, and perhaps merit
a different consideration.
A majority of the court think the decree of the Chancellor should
be reversed, and the case remanded to the Court of Chancery, with
instructions to dismiss the bill with costs, making such other orders
in the case as may by required to preserve the interests of all concerned.

THOMPSON vs. VANCE.

In the Kentucky Court of Appeals, October, 1858.
S. S. THOMPSON, APPELLANT against W. L. VANCE, APPELLEE.
Where A made to B a deed of gift, embracing both personalty and realty, in which
deed was a special power in the nature of an appointment, which B executed
by his last will according to the terms of the power: Held, that the wife was
not entitled to dower in the realty so conveyed by deed of gift.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
DUVAL, J.-George Thompson was the owner of a large estate,
consisting chiefly of land and slaves in the county of Mercer.
George C. Thompson was his only child; the latter had been married three times in the lifetime of his father, and had made his
father's house the home of himself and his family. It appears that
George Thompson had never given his son any part of his estate,
and that this circumstance occasioned such dissatisfaction on the
part of his son's third wife, who is the appellant in this case; that
she, after the birth of two children, determined to return to her
father's house with her children in the winter of 1823 and '24,
and there remained during the session of the legislature, of which
her husband was then a member. To induce her to return, and to
remove the cause of the difficulty between her and her husband,
George Thompson, on the 19th of January, 1824, executed to his
son, G. C. Thompson, a deed for over one thousand acres of valuable land, and about fifty slaves. He at the same time wrote a letter
to his son, informing him of the gift, and of his intention to give
him more at a futare period, and stating also his intention to build
another residence on another part of his land, either for himself
or his son, as might be afterwards determined.
Mrs. Thompson thereupon agreed to return, and did return with
her husband to their former home. George Thompson, in accordance with the intention expressed in the letter referred to, went on
to build another residence at a place called "Pleasant Fields," to
which he removed, leaving-his son George and his family in posses-
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sion of the old homestead, called "Shawanee Springs." On the
5th of August, 1825, which was about the time of his removal,
George Thompson executed to his son a deed of conveyance for the
Shawanee Springs tract of land, which deed, after describing the
tract of land by'metes and bounds, contains the following provision: "To be held, occupied, used, and employed by him, during
his life; and he is further, if he deems it proper during his life, to
transfer and convey to any one or more of his posterity, the whole
or any part or parts of said tract of land at his pleasure; and at
the death of said G. 0. Thompson the said land, in the whole or in
parts, is to be vested in his posterity, or such of them, one or more,
as he may select, choose, and direct by his last will, should he not
have done it in his lifetime by deed. And the said G. 0. Thompson is also at liberty, and is hereby vested with the right, if he
thinks proper so to do, by his last will and testament, to vest in any
-widow he may leave, an estate in said land, or any part thereof,
not to extend to a greater or better estate than during her remaining his widow; but the same is never to be the dower of his widow,
or any part thereof, or subject, under any circumstances, to the
claim of dower by said widow."
Afterwards, on the 22d June, 1830, he also executed to his son
a conveyance for about fifty slaves, which contains the following
provision:
"The said slaves and their increase to be had, held, and used
by my said son, G. 0. Thompson, for his own use and benefit during his natural life, and after his death to go to, and be divided
among the children, or any one or more of the children or grandchildren of my said son, in such manner and proportions to each,
and under such limitations and restrictions as to title, as my said
son shall, at his discretion, choose and think proper, to be expressed
and directed by my son, by any will or other instrument of writing
by him executed, for any part thereof, to be given and disposed of
by my said son in his lifetime, at his discretion, among his posterity
as aforesaid ; and if my said son shall choose and think proper to sell
any one or more of said slaves, he is hereby authorized to do so,
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without being in any way accountable to his children, in consequence thereof, or for the purchase money, or he may exchange
any one or more of them for other slaves, taking the bill or bills of
sale, at his discretion, conveying a title with the same limitations
as those contained in the present deed of gift; and my son is also
fully authorized to bind any or all of the slaves aforesaid, or any
of their increase, to any widow he may leave at his decease, to her
use, for any length of time he may choose, not exceeding the term
of her widowhood, subject, at the expiration of said lease, to the
distribution which my son may direct, as aforesaid, among any one
or more of his posterity. But it is clearly understood, that in no
event whatsoever are any of the said slaves or their increase to be
ever subject to a claim of dower by any widow which my son may
leave at his decease; and the conveyance and gift are upon this
express condition, and under this limitation."
Both deeds were recorded in March, 1851. G. 0. Thompson, the
grantor, continued in the possession of the land and slaves thus
conveyed until his death, which occurred in 1856. He left a will,
in which he made some provision for his wife, and executed the
power conferred by the deed, by devising the land and slaves to
his children, but declined leaving any part of either to his wife
during widowhood. The widow renounced the provision of the will,
and retained the possession of the mansion house and premises,
claiming the right to do so. The appellee then filed this petition,
seeking to have dower allotted to the appellant, in the land and
slaves embraced by the deed of January, 1824, and inother lands
in which they admitted she was entitled to dower, and seeking also
a settlement and distribution of the estate of their father. They
claimed that the appellant was not entitled to dower in the land
or slaves embraced in the deeds of 6th August, 1825, and 22d
June, 1830.
The appellant answered, claiming that she was entitled to dower
in the land and slaves conveyed by those two deeds, basing her
claims chiefly upon these grounds: that her late husband held the
land and slaves in contestnot under those deeds, but as the heir-
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at-law of his father, George Thompson, and that he had so held
them for such a length of time as to vest in him an absolute estate
in fee, of which she was by law endowable; and, second, that the
two deeds were devised, executed, and accepted by the parties, for
the fraudulent purpose and with the fraudulent intent to deprive
her of her right of (lower. The court below, upon final hearing,
decided against her claim to dower in the estate embraced in the
two deeds referred to; and she has prosecuted this appeal, insisting \
upon a reversal of the judgment, upon the grounds relied upon in
her answer, and upon the additional ground that the deeds themselves must be construed as vesting in the grantee an estate which
is by law subject to dower.
We proceed to consider, briefly, several questions thus presented,
and first as it respects the manner in which this estate was held by
G. C. Thompson in his lifetime; it appears that his father lived
about nine years after the execution of the deed of 1825, and four
years after that of 1830. During this period then, the son unquestionably held the land under the title created by the deeds, for he
certainly was not the heir of his father in the lifetime of the latter,
and could not therefore have held it as such. Did he renounce or
repudiate this title, or set up any adverse claim, or profess to hold
adversely to it, after his father's death ? The record contains no
proof of his having done either; on the other hand the testimony
shows conclusively that the deed of 1825 was accepted by the
grantee, and that he never pretended to claim the land under any
other title. The deed was kept from record by the most obvious
motives, and in accordance with the suggestions of the family
lawyer, who informed the parties that their failure to record would
in nowise affect its validity as to them. And that it was the intention and settled purpose of both parties that the deeds should be
recorded at a future and proper time, is also clearly established by
the testimony and the argument, which attempts to show that the
father and son had agreed that the latter was to have the privilege
of destroying the deed, and of claiming the land against its provisions, and as heirs at law, is founded upon the merest assumption,
and is opposed to all the facts and circumstances of the case.
15
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The execution and existence of the deeds were known to many
persons in the family and out of it; they invested the children of
the grantee with interests of which they could not have been divested
ly any such agreement, and the deed of the land is expressly
referred to in the will of G. Thompson.
The destruction of the deed by the grantee would therefore have
amounted to nothing; it would neither have enlarged his own estate,
nor would it have destroyed or impaired the remainder interest of
the children. But there is no proof that anything of the sort was
agreed upon, or was ever intended or contemplated by either of the
parties. At what precise period of time G. C. Thompson acquired
the possession of the slaves embraced in the deed of 1830, does not
certainly appear from the proof, and therefore some doubt whether
he had held them for four years previously to the execution of that
deed, or for a shorter period. But these are matters wholly immaterial to the questions before us. It is not denied that the slaves
were held and claimed by George C. Thompson under his father,
and it is equally clear, we think, upon this record, that he continued
to hold them up to the date of the deed as the bailee of and under
a loan from his father. He united with his father in the execution
of that deed, and he, and all claiming under him, were ever afterwards estopped to deny the provision title of the grantor, or to
set up any claim inconsistent with the title conferred by the deed to
which George C. Thompson was a party, and which limited his
interest in the slaves to a life estate merely.
Second. In regard to the alleged fraud in the execution of the
deeds in question, we need only say, that the proof wholly'fails to
support the charge so often reiterated in the answer of the appellant,
and the argument of the counsel. What rights had she in the estate
owned by George Thompson, of which she could have been defrauded
by any disposition he may have chosen to make of it. The property was his own absolutely-neither she nor her husband had a
shadow of legal right to any part of it; and if he had chosen by
deed or devise to give the whole to a stranger she would have had
the same ground to question such disposition as she has for impeaching these conveyances to his son. The whole ground of complaint
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in the one case or in the other, would have amounted to nothing
more than that George Thompson had failed to confer upon either
her husband or herself such an interest in his estate as he had power
to do, and might have done.
The charge of fraud is considered utterly groundless.
Third. The remaining question relates to the construction and
effect of the two deeds. What estate do they confer upon the
grantee, G. 0. Thompson ? In the deed for the land, the language
is "to be held, occupied and used and employed by him during his
life," and in the deed for the slaves it is "to be held and used by my
said son, G. 0. Thompson, for his own use and benefit during his natural life." These expressions clearly define the estate and interest
with which the grantee was invested. That estate and interest is
strictly and explicitly limited to a life estate, and there is nothing
else contained in either deed which can be construed as operating to
enlarge it, for between the estate thus limited to the grantee and the
powers created and defined by the subsequent provisions, there is an
obvious distinction, and when, as in this case, the powers are
restricted to particular objects, they can never be so executed by
the helder or donee as to make himself the beneficiary, as he might
do if the powers were general. In the dispositions which G. 0.
Thompson was authorized to make of the property embraced by
both deeds, he was expressly confined and restricted to his posterity. It is true that he was authorized to sell or exchange the
slaves, for the proceeds of which he was not to be held liable to
his children. Yet he was not authorized to give them, except
to his posterity, nor to emancipate them; and this restriction
upon the right of disposition reduces the power from a general
to a special or particular power. But even if the power conferred
by the deed bad been general, and had authorized the grantee
to dispose of the property at his discretion, still the life estate to
which the power was annexed would not have been enlarged into a
fee simple estate. This is well settled by the authorities. " A devise to A, for life expressly," (as in this case,) "with remainder to
such persons as he shall by deed or will appoint, will, of course, not
give him the absolute interest, although he may acquire it by the
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exercise of his power." (Sugden on Powers, 99.) And if in such
case A should die before making an appointment to himself under
the power, his widow would not be entitled to dower. A case still
stronger against the right of the wife, is stated by the same author
elsewhere. He says, "that if an estate is limited to such uses as A
shall appoint and until appointment to A and his heirs in fee simple,
an appointment by A will cut off the right of dower of A's wife,
which attached in the fee vested in him until he does appoint."

(P. 337.)
Whenever a power is clearly intended to be given, the devisee
cannot be regarded as taking the fee. Thus in the case of Collins
vs. (larlysle, 7 B. Monr. 14. The devise was in these words:
" the balance of my estate, wholly, I leave to my beloved wife,
Nancy Carlysle, and to be disposed of by her, and divided
among my children at her discretion." It was held that she took
but a life estate, and having died without fully executing the power,
her children took the estate not as heirs, but under the will. The
,same principle is settled in the case of 11cG-augfiey's administrator
vs. Henry, 15 B. Monr. 383. But we deem it unnecessary to multiply
the citations of authorities upon this point, feeling satisfied that
under any admissible construction of the deed under consideration,
George C. Thompson must be regarded as having been entitled to a
life estate only in the property conveyed by them, and that his
widow, the appellant, was not entitled to dower either in the land
or slaves.
The judgment therefore is affirmed.'
Query-would not 'helaw have been held otherwise as to the deed of gift of the
slaves in most, or all of the other States ? See 10 Yerg. 290; 2 Swan, 620-Id.
112; 10 Johnson, 19; 10 Pick. 607.-Note b5y t/he Reporter.

STATE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. vs. ROBERTS.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, at Philadelphia,
January 1859.
STATE MUTUAL INSURANCE COM'PANY VS. ROBERTS.
1. A policy of insurance against fire, assigned -as collateral security for a mortgage, is liable to be avoided in the hands of the mortgagee, by any subsequent
breach of the conditions of the insurance by the owner of the property, though
the assignment may have been duly approved by the Insurance Company.
2. Where a policy so assigned, and duly approved, contained the usual provision
that "if the insured, or his assigns, should thereafter effect any other insurance
on the same property, and should not wvith all reasonable diligence give notice
thereof-and have the same endorsed on the policy, or otherwise acknowledged
in writing, the policy should cease and be of no further effect," and the mortgagor
subsequently, without the knowledge of the mortgagee, effected another insurance on the property, which he neglected to give notice of, it was held that the
first insurance was thereby avoided, and that no recovery could be had thereon
by the mortgagee.

Error to the District Court of Allegheny County:
This was an action on a policy of insurance made by the plaintiffs
in error. The facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of
the court, which was delivered January 3d, 1859, by
STRONG, J.-There is but a single question in this case.
It is
raised by the answer given in the court below to the first point propounded by the, defendants.
The policy contained the usual provisions, that it should not be
assignable, unless the assignee should, before any loss, give notice
of the assignment in pursuance of the by-laws of the company, and
have the same endorsed on or annexed to the policy. One of the
by-laws designated the mode in which assignments should be made,
and required that they should be approved by a director.
Another provision of the policy, also an usual one, was, that if
the insured or his assigns should thereafter effect any other insurance on the same property, and should not, with all reasonable
diligence, give notice thereof to the secretary, and have the same
endorsed on the policy, or otherwise acknowledged in writing, the
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policy should cease and be of no further effect, and that in all cases
of other insurance on the property, whether prior or subsequent to
the date of the policy, in case of loss or damage by fire, the insured
should. not be entitled to demand or recover on the policy any
greater portion of the loss or damage sustained than the amount
insured on said property. Both these provisions were material
parts of the contract, and both designed for the protection of the
underwriters. They cannot be deprived of these stipulated defences
without their consent. The safety of the insurance is dependent
much upon the character of the assured, not alone upon his integrity
and good faith, but upon his habits of carefulness, of prudence and
vigilance. It is obvious that the danger of fire may be much less
-when the assured is a man watchful and provident, than where he is
heedless and negligent as well as dishonest. The provision, therefore, which requires assignments of a policy to be made with the
consent of the insurers, and to be approved by them, is not unmeaning. Nor is its purpose to stipulate for a new contract with
the assignee. It is designed rather to afford substantial protection
to the underwriters, by enabling them to preserve, during the continuance of the risk, the safeguards which existed at its origin, those
found in the honesty and watchfulness of the assured. It was for
this reason that it was early laid down that a fire policy could not
be assigned pending the risk, so as to give to the assignee any
interest in it whatever, either legal or equitable. Ld. Chan. King,
in Lynch vs. .Dalzell,4 Bro. P. C. 431. Such a policy has, indeed,
in some of the later cases, been held assignable in equity, with the
subject itself, where it contained no provision to the contrary, and
it is on that account that the prohibition to assign has been generally introduced.
The other provision in this policy which has been referred to, is
even more substantial; so important, indeed, that without it the
business of insurance could hardly exist.
The contract of
insurance is pre-eminently one in which good faith is demanded. But experience has shown that some other reliance than
that upon good faith is necessary. Accordingly, it is generally
made the interest of the assured to preserve the property from fire.
His interest is made to concur with that of the insurers. It was so
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in this case. The subject was valued at $4,500, but the sum
insured was only $2,500. Thus the assured remained his own
insurer for $2,000, and had a direct personal interest in the preservation of the property beyond the indemnity promised in the policy.
Had be been permitted to insure the same buildings in other companies until the entire value was covered, the protection which the
insurer had in his prudent regard for his own interest would have
been lost. Not only would temptations to dishonesty have been
multiplied, but the common inducements to care and watchfulness
on his part would have been taken away. It was for this reason
that the stipulation was introduced that other insurance without
notice to these underwriters and approved by them should avoid the
policy. It is for similar reasons that this same provision is found
in almost every policy of insurance. And even when double insurance has been made by consent, the assured, in case of a loss is only
allowed to recover ratably.
The risk in this case was upon the interest of the owner in a
dwelling house. The contract was made with him and the policy
was taken out in his name. With the consent of the insurers, he
then assigned the policy to Blackbourne, to whom he bad given a
mortgage upon the property insured, and also upon other property.
The mortgagee assigned the policy to Scott, the equitable plaintiff
also with the assent of the defendants. Afterwards, Roberts, the
party assured, effected another insurance upon the same building
with a different company, and gave no notice thereof to the defendants, nor had it endorsed upon the policy issued by them. The
naked question is whether the second insurance having been made
by Roberts, without notice to the defendants, after the assignment
of the first policy, avoided it.
It is not denied that in the hands of Roberts, the original assured,
the policy would be utterly worthless, but it is insisted that in the
hands of Scott who holds under an assignment with the consent of
the defendants, it is still available. A policy of insurance is not a
negotiable instrument. It is assignable only in equity. Consequently the assignee takes subject to all the equities which existed
between the original parties at the time of the assignment. He
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takes it, however, burthened with no other equities than those
which existed at the time of the assignment and notice thereof. But
it does not follow from this, that by the assignment and notice the
underwriters are deprived of the combined protection of the stipulations of their contract. These are not equities. They are legal
rights which are cut off by no transfer of the instrument. While
subsequently accruing secret equities between the original parties
and those which may arise outside of the contract cannot affect the
assignee,. yet he takes the instrument as it is, bound by all its
expressed provisions. The assignment does not change the contract,-it simply converts one of the parties into a trustee for a third
person. Every condition precedent upon which the liability to pay
is made to depend, remains as before. Were it not so, it would not
be an assignment, but a new contract. Now, by the express terms
of this policy, the defendants were to become liable to pay, in case
of a loss, only upon the condition that neither Roberts, nor any
person to whom he might assign it, should effect a second insurance
without giving notice to them, and having the same endorsed on the
policy, or otherwise acknowledged in writing. To strike out the
condition, would make the liability absolute; an obligation which
they never assumed. It is perfectly consistent for a man to engage
for himself and for another, and the liability of a promisor may be
made dependent upon the action or non-action, both of the promisee
and one who has no interest in the contract. In such a case, he
who takes an assignment from the promisee may be affected by the
conduct of others after the assignment. The possibility is inherent
to the contract. And here, when it is remembered that the object
of the prohibition to either Roberts or his assigns, against obtaining
additional assurance without consent, was to maintain an interest in
the assured to preserve the property from destruction, it seems quite
clear that the intention of the parties was that no other insurance
should be obtained upon the building by any one during the continuance of the risk; for if, when the policy had been assigned, the
assignor might obtain new insurance elsewhere, he 'would cease to
have any interest in protecting the property against fire.
The argument of the plaintiff, therefore, in order to be success-
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ful, must establish the position that the assignment of the policy,
with the consent of the underwriters created a new contract with
the assignee, a contract that did not embrace the stipulations that
existed in the policy before the assignment. Sensible of this, he
has strenuously urged, that by the assignment, with the consent of
the underwriters, the policy ceased to be an engagement to indemnify
the mortgagor, and was converted into a contract to indemnify the
mortgagee. Both the mortgagor and mortgagee have insurable
interests. Each may take out a policy, but the insurances are entirely independent of each other. The interests are not the same,
and neither can claim from the insurer more than indemnity for the
destruction of his interest. But if by an assignment by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, with the assent of the insurer, the policy
becomes a contract of indemnity to the mortgagee-then when the
interest of the mortgagee ceases, the policy necessarily dies. Payment of the debt by the mortgagor would annihilate the contract
of insurance. Yet it cannot be doubted, that if Roberts had paid
the mortgage debt to Scott, the equitable interest in the policy
would have immediately reverted to him. The contract would have
continued in force for the indemnity of the owner. How could this
be if it had become an insurance upon the mortgagee's interest?
So, had the assignment been made in the same form to one who
was not a mortgagee, and who had no interest in the building, if it
was not the mortgagor's interest which remained insured, there
would have been no insurance; for in the case supposed the holder
of the policy would have had no insurable interest. Such a result
will hardly be pretended. Even in Massachusetts, where an assignee of a policy, assigned with the consent of the insurers, is permitted to sue in his own name, it is settled that the assignor, is the
person who continues to be insured, notwithstanding the assignment.
In Philips vs. The 3Merrimack Jiutual Fire Insurance Cornpany, 10 Cush. 350, Metcalf, Justice, in speaking of such a case
said, " The only effect, therefore, of the assignment of the policy
to the plaintiff was to authorize the defendants to pay to him, instead of Flint, (the assignor,) the amount of any loss for which
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they might be liable under the policy. And their assent to the
assignment is tantamount to an express promise to pay the plaintiff
accordingly." He adds, "it was Flint's interest which was insured, and he continued to be the party insured." See also
lJieComber vs. Ins. Co., 8 Cush. 133, to the same effect. That the
assignee may, in Massachusetts, sue in his own name does not touch
the question, for though he becomes a legal plaintiff, yet the promise which he seeks to enforce is that which is contained in the
policy, subject to all its expressed conditions. The supposition
that there is some magic in the assent of the underwriters to an
assignment, which converts the policy into a new contract with the
assignee arises out of a misapprehension of the purpose for which
such assent is required. As already stated, it is not to enlarge the
engagements of the insurers, nor to enable them to waive any of
the conditions, on the performance of which their liability depends.
It is not to give new privileges to the assured, which, without it, he
would not have, but it is solely for the protection of the insurers.
It would be a perversion of its design to give it any other effect.
The assignment then must be regarded as an appointment of Scott,
the equitable plaintiff, to receive any money which might become
due to Roberts, by reason of a loss sustained by him, and not as
a contract to indemnify the mortgagee. It has been likened, in
the argument, to an assignment of a bond, with the assent of the
obligor, and correctly enough. It is said that after such a transfer
it is not in the power of the assignor to do anything to discharge
the obligor. That may be admitted when the bond has been given
to secure present indebtedness. But the liability of the insurer is
Suppose the assigned bond had only bound the
conditional.
obligor to pay on condition that neither the obligee nor his assigns
should set up a trade in a certain village. Such a bond would be
more like this policy. The obligor might well consent to its transfer, and admit that he had no defence against paying it according
to its'conditions, but who would say that he would be bound to pay
if the obligee, after the assignment, should set up the trade in that
village.
I am aware that there are to be found in the decisions of two of
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the courts of our sister-States, adjudications that such assignments,
with the consent of the underwriters, are equivalent to new policies
issued to the assignees. Of course, it is meant to refer only to those
cases where the assignees have an insurable interest; for, as the
contract is one of indemnity, where there is no interest there
can be no loss. These cases are: The Traders' Insurance Company
vs. Roberts, 9 Wendell, 404; Tillou vs. JingstonInsurance Company, 1 Selden, 405 ; and CharlestonInsurance Company vs. 2Neve,
2 McMullin, 237. Both the latter were decided on the authority
of the former. That was a case in the Supreme Court of New York,
and so far as it related to the doctrine now under discussion, was
never reviewed in the Court of Appeals. There, a mortgagor having effected an insurance on the mortgaged property, assigned his
policy to the mortgagee, with the assent of the insurers. It contained a condition against other insurance, similar to that which is
found in this policy. After the assignment, he effected another
insurance upon the same property. It was held that though the
assignee was compelled to sue in the name of the original insured,
yet the subsequent insurance did not affect his right to recover.
He was treated as if the policy had been issued to protect his interest as mortgagee. It must be admitted that this case is in entire
accordance with the ruling of the court in the case now before us.
It was followed in New York by Tillou vs. The Kingston Insurance
Company, 1 Selden, 405, which was decided upon its authority alone,
without any examination of the correctness of the principle asserted
in it. The South Carolina case was also decided with Traders'Insurance Compnny vs. Roberts in view, and in part rests upon it.
Judge Butler, however, who delivered the opinion of the court,
expressed a doubt whether that case had not gone too far. These
are all the cases known by me in which the doctrine has been sustained. It has its root entirely in Insurance Company vs. Roberts.
But the doctrine of that case, has been completely exploded, and
it is no longer authority even in New York. In Grosvenorvs. The Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, recently decided by the Court of
Appeals, and reported in 7 Am. Law Reg. 118, it has been thoroughly
reviewed and overruled. So also has Tillou vs. The Kingston
Insurance (Jompany. Harris, Justice, in delivering the opinion of
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the court, remarked: "The undertaking to pay the plaintiff was
an undertaking collateral to and dependent upon the principal undertaking to insure the mortgagor. The effect of it was that the defendants agreed that whenever any money should become due to the
mortgagor upon the contract of insurance, they would, instead of
paying to the mortgagor himself, pay it to the plaintiff. The mortgagee must sustain a loss for which the insurers were liable, before
the party appointed to receive the money would have a right to
claim it. It is the damage received by the party appointed to receive
it, that is recoverable from the insurers. The insurance being upon
the interest of the mortgagor, and he having parted with that interest before the fire, no loss was sustained by him, and none was
recoverable by his assignee or appointee. The right of such a party
being wholly derivative, cannot exceed the right of the party under
-whom he claims." And again, in language equally strong: "The
defendants contracted with McCarty, the mortgagor, and not with
the plaintiff. They agreed upon the performance of certain conditions, to pay for him to the plaintiff, certain money. Some of these
conditions were positive in their character, others negative; certain
things were to be done by the assured, and other things were not
to be done. If all these conditions were-performed, then, if a loss
occurred, the defendants agreed to indemnify him against that loss,
to the extent specified in the policy, and he appointed the plaintiff
to receive from the defendants the amount for which they were thus
contingently liable. The terms of the contract have never been
waived, released or modified. The defendants have shown an express
violation of one or more of the conditions upon which their liability
was to depend." The court also declared that there was no difference between that case and that of an assignment of a policy to a
mortgagee, with the consent of the insured. In either case the
insurance is upon the interest of the mortgagor. Such an appointment or assignment ought not to be construed so as to vary, in any
respect, the liabilities of the insurers upon their original contract.
The court therefore ruled that the plaintiff could not recover.
I have referred at considerable length to this case, because it covers
the whole ground in controversy, because it reviews fully the preceding cases that assert a different doctrine, and because its reason-
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ing commends itself to our approval. Carpentervs. The Providence
Washington Insurance Company, 16 Peters, 495, maintains the
same views which were expressed by the Court of Appeals of New
York. Enough has, however, been said to show that in our opinion,
the defendants are not liable either to Roberts or to his assignee,
upon this policy, the conditions upon which their obligation to pay
rests, not having been fully fulfilled by the assured.
The judgment is reversed and a venire de novo awarded.
In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, January 13, 1859.
[Before Lowrie, C. J. and Woodward, Strong, and Read, JJ.]
THE WESTERN INSURANCE COMPANY VS. CROPPER.
Where, in a policy of insurance, the excepting clause was in these words--" it is
understood that this company is not liable for any breakage or derangement of
the engine, or bursting of the boiler, or any of the parts thereof, or for the
effects of fire connected with the operation of, or the repairs of the engine or
boiler, unless the damage be occasioned and the repairs rendered necesssary by
the stranding or sinking of the vessel, after her engines and boilers shall have
been put in successful operation"-it was held, that the purpose of the exception
-wasonly to relieve the underwriters from liability to indemnify the assured for
broken or deranged machinery, and not to exempt them from the obligations to
pay for a total loss, even though that loss could be traced back to the breakage
of the machinery.

The opinion of the court, in which the facts appear, was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The inquiry raised by the pleadings, relates to the
question of the exception inserted in the policy. It is entirely a
question of construction. The contract was one of insurance upon
the hull, tackle, machinery and apparel of a steam propeller, but it
stipulates for exemption from liability for certain losses. The stipulation was inserted by the underwriters, and was intended for their
benefit. If it is obscure, it is their fault. If it be capable of two interpretations equally reasonable, that must be adopted which is most
favorable to the assured, for the language is that of the insurers.
The excepting clause in the policy is in the following words: "It
is understood that this company is not liable for any breakage or
derangement of the engine, or bursting of the boiler or any of the
parts thereof, or for the effects of fire from any cause connected
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with the operation of or the repairs of the engine or boiler, unless the
damage be occasioned and the repairs rendered necessary by the
stranding or sinking of the vessel, after her engines and boilers
shall have been put in successful operation. It is also understood
that this company is not liable for fuel, wages and provisions, nor
for. any expenses of any delay consequent upon repairs to the
engine or boiler of any kind, or repairs to the hull, if such repairs
are rendered necessary by breakage or derangement of machinery
or bursting of boiler."
It is not to be denied that the intention of the parties is far from
being clearly expressed in this excepting clause. The controversy
is, however, all in regard to the first exception, and we are of opinion that its purpose was only to relieve the underwriters from
liability to indemnify the assured for broken or deranged machinery, and not to exempt them from the obligation to pay for a
total loss, even though that loss could be traced back to the breakage of the machinery as its first cause. The exemption embraces
three kinds of losses. First, breakage or derangement of the engine,
or bursting of the boiler, or any part thereof; second, the effects of
fire arising from certain causes; and third, fuel, wages and provisions, and expenses of delay consequent upon repairs to the engine,
boiler or hull, if rendered necessary by breakage of the machinery.
If it was the intention of the parties, by the first exemption, to
except from the contract of indemnity all loss directly consequent
upon breakage, it would have been easy to have done so clearly by
the insertion of two or three additional words. That the difference
between damage itself and loss, as well as causing one, and the loss
caused, was in the minds of the insurers, may be inferred from the
fact that by the second exemption, they have protected themselves
against such consequential loss. They expressly provide against
liability "for the effects of fire from any cause connected with the
operation of or the repairs of an engine and boiler," but they
.expressly exclude effects of breakage, or derangement of the engine,
or bursting of the boiler, or any part thereof. The difference in
the mode of expression is indicative of a difference of intention.
It is difficult, also, to account for the additional stipulation contained in the third exception, if the first was designed to embrace the
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consequences of breaking of the machinery. In that case, expenses
of delay consequent upon repairs to the engine or boiler, or repairs
to the hull, rendered necessary by breakage or derangement of the
machinery, are twice excluded from the second. These things are
but consequences of breakage. Why stipulate the second time for
their exception, if they had already been excepted? No satisfactory
reason has been given for it. Parties are not to be presumed to have
intended mere repetition. It seems clear that something additional
was meant, which had not before been excepted. To allow any
force to the first part of the exempting clause, the first must be
construed as extending only to immediate damage to the machinery.
And it is a cardinal rule of construction that effect should be given,
if possible, to every part of the instrument. The general provisions
of the policy cover the whole loss, however occasioned. The underwriters limit the general words by stipulating that they are not
liable for breakage, nor for expenses of delay, caused by breakage,
or by repairs consequent upon breakage. The exception itself raises
an implication, that for all other consequences of breakage not mentioned, they were to remain responsible under their general covenant
of insurance. This interpretation is consistent with all the provisions of the policy, and leaves no part of it without meaning.
Judgment affirmed.

RECENT ENGLISH

CASES.

Judicial Committee of the Privy Counsel.
GILMOUR vs. SUPPLE.
S. had a raft which bad been measured by an official person as of 71,443 feet,
and putting this measurement in G's hands, agreed as follows: "Sold to G. a
raft, the quantity about 71,000 feet, to be delivered at the I. booms, price 7d.
per foot." S. conveyed the raft to the I. booms, giving notice thereof to G's servants, who helped to fasten it there. A storm having arisen and destroyed the
raft: Held, affirming the judgment of the court of error, Upper Canada, that there
was evidence for the jury of delivery, and they having found the fact of delivery,
the risk fell on G., for the contract did not imply that anything more was to be
done by S. on his own or on G's behalf, or in which both were to concur before
the property passed.

GILMOUR vs. SUPPLE.

This was an appeal from the Court of Error and appeal of Upper
Canada.
The action was brought originally in the Court of Common Pleas
by Supple against Gilmour. The first count of declaration alleged
that in consideration that the plaintiff would sell and deliver to the
defendant a raft of timber, then lying at Carouge, containing about
71,000 feet, and deliver the same at Indian Cove booms, at the price
of 7jd. per foot, amounting to 23071. Is. 7d., defendant undertook
to pay for the same one-third in cash, one-third at sixty days, and
one-third at ninety days from the delivery. Averment, delivery at
Indian Cove booms and non-payment.
Count for goods sold and delivered.
Plea, non assumpsit.
Secondly, to the first count that plaintiff did not deliver the raft.
At the trial the plaintiff gave in evidence that he was possessed
of a raft of timber lying at Carouge, and that on the 20th Oct. 1853,
he entered into a contract in writing with the defendant in these
words:-" Sold Allen Gilmour and Co., a raft of timber now at
Carouge, containg white and red pine, the quantity about 71,000
feet, to be delivered at Indian Cove booms; price for the whole 71d.
per foot; payments, one-third cash, sixty and ninety days date.
JOHN SUPPLE,
A. G. and Co.
"Quebec, 20th Oct. 1853."
The contract was written by defendant, and signed by him "A.
G. and Co.," and by plaintiff, "John Supple." He also proved that
before the contract was made, the raft had been measured for him
by an officer appointed under a Canadian Act, by whom a specification was made out showing the contents of each log, and making
a total of 71,443 feet.
That specification was given by the plaintiff to the defendant
before the contract was made; he therefore knew what quantity of
timber the seller would charge him with, notwithstanding the form
of the written contract, which left it unascertained. The defendant
retained the specification, and sent it over to Indian Cove, where
he had booms and an establishment for receiving and storing timber.
The evidence showed it to be usual for purchasers of rafts, some-
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times before, sometimes after they were placed within the booms, to
check over the logs received with the specification previously delivered, to see that they corresponded with it, but there was no evidence
of its being usual to measure the contents of each log to ascertain
the number of feet contained in it. It was also proved that delivery at a boom, meant delivery outside the boom.
The raft was towed down the river from Carouge, or Cap Rouge,
to Indian Cove, about eight miles, by a steamboat employed by the
plaintiff; one of his men went with it, and at Indian Cove gave
'notice to the defendant's servants there that it had arrived, and they
together fastened it outside the booms. There was conflicting
evidence as to whether possession of the raft was given up by the
plaintiff's servant, and taken by the defendant's. In the night a
storm arose, the raft was broken up and dispersed, and a great portion of it lost.
The judge told the jury that if there was an actual delivery to the
defendant's servants, and taking possession by them, the plaintiff
was entitled to recover, but that otherwise they should find for the
defendant. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant moved,
in pursuance of leave reserved, for a nonsuit, or verdict for defendant, on the ground that there could be no delivery or acceptance of
the property sold, sufficient to sustain the action, while anything
remained to be done in order to ascertain the quantity or price; that,
according to the terms of the contract, and the evidence, it was
necessary that there should have been a counting or examination of
the contents of the raft after its arrival at the defendant's booms,
before there could have been such a delivery or acceptance as the
plaintiff was required to prove, and that such counting or examination never having taken place, there was no delivery or acceptance,
It was also contended that the verdict was against evidence, but
it was not now necessary to consider that question, in being admitted that if the property was changed, the verdict must stand. A
rule to show cause was granted, and, after argument, discharged.
The following were the material points of the judgment as stated
by Macaulay, C. J. :-The present case differs from Logan vs.
Lernesurier,6 Moore, P. C. 116, in these important particulars,
16
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that there the timber, if rafted, was at a great distance, and had,
not like the plaintiff's, reached the market, nor could it do so until
several months after the contract, and when it arrived it was to be
paid for on delivery, measured off, (that is measured off in the raft;)
whereas in the present case the plaintiff owned and was possessed of
the raft, which had reached the market, was securely boomed, and
had been measured off before the sale, and no such words are contained in the written note of such sale. Then, tried by Lord
Brougham's rules in that case, here is not an agreement to sell, but
a sale: -Sold" which imports an actual sale as distinguished from
a mere agreement to sell Wilkes vs. Smith, 10 M. & W. 360 ; Playfair vs. Musgrove, 14 M. & W. 244, "sold a specific raft of
timber, in bulk about 71,000 feet, to be delivered at Indian Cove
booms, price for the whole 71d., one-third cash, sixty and ninety
days' date." It may be said, price for the whole refers to' about
71,000 feet, and that it was impossible to determine what sum was
to be paid until measured, or rendered certain at the delivery. But
Lord Brougham says, it is necessary that there should be a price
ascertainable; here it was ascertainable by a past, not a future
measurement, and this seems to distinguish it from those cases in
which something remaining to be done by the vendor to ascertain
the amount of an agreed ratable price, such as weighing, measuring,
counting, &c., it has been held the property, i. e. the right of
property, did not pass from the vendor and vest in the vendee.
And that his lordship was contemplating cases circumstanced like
the present, is, I think, shown by his language as he proceeds.
Governed by intention, then, as elicited from the terms of the agreement, construed with reference to the state of facts attending the
transaction at the time the contract was made, so far as the same
may be legally shown, or in evidence, what was the intention? Was
it an absolute sale, or only an agreement by plaintiff to sell at a
period of time at Indian Cove? No time being fixed for delivery, a
reasonable time would be intended; the place of delivery was Indian
Cove; the place of sale and purchase, Carouge. The payment to
be made on delivery, and nothing remained to be done by the vendor
but to deliver, to entitle him to the price. Then is it a rule, that
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if the vendors, owning a specific chattel at a specific place, sell it
and agree to deliver it at another place, the right of property as
well as of possession remains in them until delivery, as if the delivery afterwards was to constitute both the sale and delivery, or as if
the sale was inchoate as a sale until delivery; or a conditional sale,
a sale of specific goods upon condition that the vendor delivered the
goods at a specific place: Acraman vs. Morris, 8 0. B. 449;
Startup vs. Macdonald, 6 M. & G. 593. If the right of property
may pass to and vest in the vendee at one place, while the risk
remains with the vendor until delivery at another place, I should
think the right of property passed in this case by force of the contract of sale, and I am not satisfied that both the property and risk
did not pass, subject to the possession remaining with the vendor
to perform the undertaking to deliver it at the Indian Cove, and to
exercise his right of lien thereon till paid therefor. But it is too
doubtful a matter under the authorities referred to, and I prefer,
therefore, regarding it as if both property and risk continued with
the vendor until the raft was by him delivered at Indian Cove, in
full performance of the contract of sale on the plaintiffs part.
Assuming, then, that the property remained the plaintiffs, and at
his risk until delivered, was it delivered according to the intent and
meaning of the sale? This is to be determined by the ficts and
circumstances. So far as it rested with the jury, it has been decided in the plaintiff's favor; and the principal question now is, whether
there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury in support of that
conclusion. It appears to me the case went fairly to the jury, and
that there was ample testimony to support the verdict which they rendered. The terms of the contract would not be varied by anything
done by McCrea, plaintiff's clerk, after getting to Indian Cove booms.
He could not there assume any responsibility or risk on the part of
the plaintiff, nor could the defendant shift the risk from himself by
leaving the timber outside the booms during the night after its arrival. All that the plaintiff had to do under the terms of his contract
was to deliver the timber at Indian Cove booms. That was done,
and the defendant was notified that the timber was there. The
plaintiff had nothing to do with putting it into the booms; that
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wholly depended upon defendant and his servants. He had a right
to choose his own time. If he choose to leave it outside or neglected
to take it in, the plaintiff could not be made subject to the risk
arising from his choice or neglect. The contract, as it appears to
me, was completed on the part of the plaintiff by the bringing of the
timber to Indian Cove booms without any formal acceptance there
by the defendant. But there was evidence that defendant's clerk
had notice of its arrival, and promised to send men to take charge
of it, and that they did so far take charge of it (though they say it
was for the plaintiff) as to secure it by additional fastening to the
boom. If the timber had been brought down from Carouge by a
steamer without the presence of any one on the part of the plaintiff,
and it had been brought to the booms and there fastened, and notice
given to the defendant it could scarcely be said that the risk must
be borne by the plaintiff till the state of the weather or the convenience of the defendant admitted of its being placed in security.
The plaintiff was not bound to know anything as to defendant's
desire to have the raft taken within the boom, nor was he bound to
consult the defendant's convenience as to the time of arrival at the
booms. If it was intended by defendant that it should only be
received when the state of the tide or of the weather were such as
to admit of the booms being open with perfect safety, the contract
should so have expressed it; but in the absence of any such stipulation, I think the plaintiff did all that was incumbent on him to do,
and that he is entitled to recover the value of his timber."
From that judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of Error
and Appeal in Canada, but the judgment of the C. P. was affirmed.
He now appealed to her Majesty in Council.
Sir T. Kelly, Q. C., Wilde, Q. C., W. Murray, for the appellant,
contended that the measurement of the raft at the place of delivery
was an act to be done by the seller before the price could be ascertained or the property vest in the buyer, and that there was no
evidence that the performance of this act had been waived ; that the
seller had a lien on the timber until the cash was paid and the bills
given, and there was no evidence that he had authorized his servant
or intended to abandon such lien ; that there was no evidence of any
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authority from the buyer to his servants to accept the raft without
measurement; that the conduct of the buyer's servants was ambiguous, and that the judge should have explained to the jury the legal
effect of such conduct.
H. Bill, Q. C. and Unthan, for the respondent, contended that
this was the sale of an ascertained article, viz. the raft, the quantity
of timber in which had been already ascertained, and nothing further
remained to be done by the vendor but to deliver such raft; that it
was a question for the jury whether there was a delivery or not, and
they had rightly found for the plaintiff, and that the conduct of the
appellant showed that they held the raft as delivered.
The following authorities were referred to :-.Logan vs..-Le Mesurier, 6 Moore Pr. C. 116; Acraman vs. Morris, 4 C. B. 449;
H anson vs. Meyer, 6 East, 614; Simmons vs. Swift, 5 B. & C.
857; Shepley vs. Davis, 5 Taunt. 617; Swanwicic vs. Sothern, 9
Ad. &Ell. 895; Bugg vs. Minett, 11 East, 522; Rhodes vs. Thwaites,
6 B. & C. 388 ; Bush vs. Davis, 2 Al. & S. 397; Tansley vs. Turner,
6 A. & G. 593.
2 Bing. N. C. 151; Startup vs. .zadonald,

Cur. adv. vult.
Judgment was delivered by
The Right Hon. Sir C. CRESSWELL.-It was contended here, as
in the Canadian courts, that by virtue of this contract, and the acts
done in pursuance of it, the property in the raft did not vest in the
defendant, but was still in the seller, and at his risk, when the loss
happened. It is impossible to examine the decisions on this subject
without being struck by the ingenuity with which sellers have contended that the property in goods contracted for had or had not
become vested in the buyers, according as it suited their interest;
and buyers, or their representatives have, with equal ingenuity,
endeavored to show that they had or had not acquired the property
in that for which they contracted; and judges have not unnaturally
appeared anxious to find reasons for giving a judgment which seemed
to them most consistent with natural justice. Under such circumstances it cannot occasion much surprise if some of the numerous
reported decisions have been made to depend upon very nice and
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subtle distinctions, and if some of them should not appear altogether
reconcilable with each other. Nevertheless, we think that in all
of them certain rules and principles have been recognized, by the
application of which to this case we may be enabled to arrive at a
correct judgment upon it. By the law of England, by a contract
for the sale of specific ascertained goods, the property immediately
vests in the buyer, and a right to the price in the seller, unless it can
be shown that such was not the intention of the parties. Various
circumstances have been treated by our courts as sufficiently indicating such contrary intention. If it appears that the seller is to
do something to the goods sold on his own behalf, the property will
not be changed until he has done it, or waived his right to do it.
The case of Hanson and another, assignees of Wallace vs. Meyer,
6 East, 614, one of the earliest reported, on this subject, furnishes
an instance of this kind. Meyer had a quantity of starch, weight
unknown, lying in the warehouse of a third person. A broker
employed by Wallace purchased the whole of the starch of Meyer,
more or less, whatever it was, at 61. per cwt; it was in papers; the
weight was to be afterwards ascertained at the price aforesaid. The
mode of delivery in such cases was stated to be as follows: "The
seller gives the buyer a note addressed to the warehouse-keeper, to
weigh and deliver the goods to the buyer. This note is taken to the
warehouse-keeper, and is his authority to weigh and deliver the goods
to the vendee." Such a note was given; and on two several days
the warehouse-keeper, in pursuance of it, weighed and delivered 21
cwt. 1 qr. 6 lbs., and 15 cwt. 1 qr. 4 lbs. Before the residue had
been weighed or delivered Wallace became bankrupt, and Meyer
then took it away from the warehouse, and the assignees of Wallace
sued him in trover for it. The court held that they could not
recover, for that the particular terms of the contract made weighing
a condition precedent to the absolute vesting of the property, and
that the seller did not, by weighing and delivering part, waive the
preliminary act of weighing in respect of any part of the commodity
contracted for. The only authority given to the warehouse-keeper
was to weigh and deliver, and unless he weighed he had no authority
to deliver. But it would seem that if the warehouse-keeper had been
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authorized to deliver without weighing, and possession had under
that authority been given to the purchaser, the property would have
vested absolutely in him, and the seller would have waived his right
to weigh before delivery. Another rule may be extracted from the
case of Bugg vs. Minett, 11 East, 522, viz., that where the seller
is to do some act for the benefit of the buyer, to place the goods
sold in a state to be delivered, until he has done it the property does
not pass. In this case it was for the interest of the seller to contend that it did pass. The circumstances were as follow: A quantity of turpentine in casks was sold by auction for the defendant,
in whose warehouse it was lying. The casks were marked as of a
certain weight, and it was agreed that they should be taken at that
weight; but it was further agreed that they should be filled up by
the seller. The plaintiff bought thirty casks, and paid money on
account. Twenty casks were afterwards filled up by the warehouseman of the defendant, but before the other ten could be filled the
whole were consumed by fire. It was held that the property in the
twenty passed, but not in the ten, and that the loss must be borne
by the parties respectively in those proportions. So also if an act
remains to be done by or on behalf of both parties before the goods
are delivered, the property is not changed; of which Wallace vs.
Breeds, 13 East, 522, furnishes an instance, where Lord Ellenborough observed that the courts had frequently laid hold of such
circumstances as existed in that case to retain the property in favor
of an unpaid seller; and that rule was acted upon by the Court of
Queen's Bench, in Simmons vs. Swift, 5 B. & C. 857, which was
an action For the price of a stack of bark, sold at 91. 5s. per ton of
21 cwt. It appeared that, after the sale, it was agreed between the
parties that the bark should be weighed by two persons, one of whom
was named by the seller, the other by the buyer. Part was weighed
and delivered, the rest was much damaged by a flood before it was
weighed, whereupon the buyer refused to take it. The court held
that, as the bark was to be weighed before delivery to ascertain the
price, and that act had not been done, the property remained in the
seller and that he must bear the loss. There, by express agreement
between them, both parties were by their agents to take part in the
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act of weighing. But the case of Logan vs. Lemesurier, 6 Moore
P. C. Cases, 116, was principally relied on by the counsel for the
appellant. The contract was in these terms: "Hart, Logan and
Co. of Montreal sell, and Le Iesurier, Routh and Co. of the same
place buy, a quantity of red pine timber, the property of Thomas
Durell, L. C., but under the control of the sellers, now lying above
the rapids, near the Chaudiere falls, Ottawa river, and stated by
Thomas Durell, to consist of 1391 pieces, measuring 50,000 feet
more or less, deliverable at Quebec on or before the 15th June next,
and payable by the purchasers' promissory notes at ninety days'
date from this date, at the rate of 9 d. per foot measured off.
Should the quantity turn out more than above stated, the surplus
to be paid for by the purchasers at 9:d. per foot on delivery; and
should it fall short, the difference to be refunded by the sellers.Signed, &c. To be delivered at M. B. Farlin's booms at Sillery
Cove, Quebec." The raft was sent to Quebec, and broken up by a
storm before possession was given to or taken by defendant. On
the one hand, it was contended that the property passed by the contract; on the other, that it was not to become vested in the defendant until the timber was measured off at Quebec. Lord Brougham,
in expressing the opinion of the Judicial Committee, gives the result
of his observations on the contract in these words (p. 133): "Taking the whole of these terms together, it appears to us that until
the measurement and delivery was made, the sale was not complete,
there being nothing in the terms to show an intention that the
property should pass before the measurement; but, on the contrary,
the intention rather appearing to be that the transfer should be
postponed until the measurement at the delivery." And again, in
p. 1:34, he says: "Taking the whole of the terms together, it
appears to us that the first part of the contract, selling an ascertained chattel for an ascertainable sum (and which, if it stood alone,
would pass the property), actually paid upon an hypothesis or estimate, is controlled by the subsequent part of the contract providing
for the possession, carriage, measurement, and delivery, all by the
seller ;" and further on, "the measurement was to be made after
the delivery at Quebec," and upon that clause in the contract the
decision evidently turned. That case differs very materially from
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the present. In this case the terms of the written contract do not
show that any future measurement of the raft was contemplated.
The seller had had the raft measured by a person whose position
would be a voucher for his accuracy. The specification showing the
exact measurement of each log was handed by him to the purchaser,
and was in his hands at the time when the contract was entered into:
he retained it and sent it over to his servants at the place where the
raft was to be delivered, in order that they might check the raft
delivered by it. There is nothing in these circumstances from which
it can be inferred that the seller was to make any further measurement of the raft in order to ascertain the price, which would be
computed from the measurement already made. The buyer might,
for his own satisfaction, as was said in Swanwick vs. Sothern, 9 Ad.
& Ell. 895, measure it when delivered, but the seller had no such
privilege or duty; and after his servant had given up possession,
and the servants of the defendants had taken it, he could neither
have claimed to resume possesssion of the raft as being his property,
nor on the ground that he had a lien upon it for the price. Moreover, in this case the evidence showed that, according to the usage
of the trade, neither party would have measured the timber at the
place of delivery, so as to ascertain the amount to be paid for it.
If the buyer had compared the logs delivered with the specification,
still that document would have been referred to for the purpose of
ascertaining their contents. There was, therefore, nothing more to
be done by the seller on his own behalf; he had ascertained the
whole price of the raft by the measurement previously made; nor
was there anything to be done by him for the buyer: the seller had,
according to his contract, conveyed the raft to Indian Cove, and,
according to the finding of the jury, had delivered it there. Nor
was there anything further to be done in which both were to concur,
as in Simmons vs. Swift, the case therefore, depends upon the effect
of a contract for the sale of certain ascertained goods, without anything to limit or control its legal operation. By such a contract
the property was changed, and the loss must fall on the buyer.
Their lordships must therefore humbly advise her Majesty to affirm
the judgment appealed from, and to dismiss this appeal with costs.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
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In the Court of Queen's Bench.
CUCKSON vs. STONE.

By an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant the former agreed to serve
the latter for the term of ten years as a servant (a brewer,) and that he would
during that time well, truly and faithfully serve him; and the defendant agreed
that during the said term he would pay the plaintiff the weekly sum of 21. 108.
During the service under the agreement, the defendant had an attack of rheumatic
gout, which required him to remove to a distance for change of air. He was
absent thirteen weeks, after which he returned to his service. The defendant
having refused to pay him the weekly sum of 21. 10s. during these thirteen weeks,
the plaintiff brought the present action: Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover.

This cause was tried at the last assizes for Derby, when a verdict
was returned for the plaintiff, with 321. 10s. damages.
The declaration stated that, by a memorandum of agreement,
dated the 30th December, 1848, between the plaintiff of the one
part, and one Watts, since deceased, and the defendant of the other
part, it was agreed that the plaintiff, in consideration of 201. paid
by them to the plaintiff on the execution of the agreement, and also
in consideration of the weekly and other payments thereby agreed
to be paid by them to the plaintiff as thereinafter mentioned, the
plaintiff did thereby agree with them, and the survivor of them,
that he should well and truly and faithfully serve them for and
during the full period of ten years as and in the capacity of a brewer;
and should during the same period observe all their lawful commands,
&c., while so serving them as brewer aforesaid, and in all things
remain, continue, and be a good, faithful and obedient servant; and
Watts and the defendant, in consideration of the premises, and also
in consideration of the due, full, and complete service of the plaintiff as aforesaid, &c., did, and each of them did thereby, for himself
and themselves, promise and agree with the plaintiff that they should
pay him 201. on the execution of the agreement, and should find and
provide the plaintiff with a dwelling house for his own occupation,
and also coals during the whole of the term of ten years, and should
pay unto the plaintiff the weekly sum of 21. 10s. during the term of
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ten years. And although all things have happened and been performed in order to entitle the plaintiff to the performance of the
promise of the defendant, yet the defendant, after the death of Watts,
refused to suffer or permit the plaintiff to continue in the defendant's
service under the agreement, and to earn his weekly wages, and
refused to pay the plaintiff the sum of 21. 10s. a week for thirteen
weeks.
The fourth plea, which was pleaded to so much of the declaration
as related to the claim for wages, stated that the plaintiff was not,
during any part of the time in respect of which such wages were
claimed, ready, willing, or able to render, and did not, in fact, during
any part of such time, render the agreed or any service in manner
and form as alleged.
Issue was joined upon this plea, and it was likewise demurred to.
It was proved at the trial that the plaintiff had under this agreement
served the defendant until Christmas 1857, when he had an attack
of rheumatic gout, which caused him to be unable to perform his
services. He received, however, his weekly wages until the following March, when he went to Brixton for change of air, and was
absent thirteen weeks, during which he received no wages, and for
which period the present action was brought. Afterwards he returned
and resumed his services.
Hayes, Serjt., having obtained a rule on the part of the defendant
to set aside the verdict, and it being arranged that the rule and the
demurrer should be argued together,
Mellor, Q. C. and Mundell showed cause.
Hayes, Serjt. contra.
The following cases were cited :-R. vs. Madington, Burr. S. 0.
675; B. vs. Wentersett, Cald. 298; Wallis vs. Warren, 4 Ex. 361;
Beale vs. Thompson, 4 East, 546; Helvile vs. .De Wo7 , 4 E. &B.
847 ; Stavers vs. Curling,3 Bing. N. C. 355; Chandlervs. Grieves,
2 H. Bl. 606; De Medina vs. Norman, 9 M. & W. 820; Aspden
vs. Austin, 5 Q. B. 671; Harmer vs. Cornelius, 82 L. T. Rep. 26.
Cur. adv. vult.
Lord CAMPBELL, C. J.-We are of opinion that this plea is good,
being pleaded only to the claim for wages, and it appeared that the
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plaintiff was not, during any part of the time in respect of which
such wages are claimed, ready and willing or able to render, and
did not in fact render, the agreed or any services. We think the
gist of this plea is, that the plaintiff during the time in question was
not ready and willing to render, and did not render any services,
and voluntarily and willfully refused. If so, we think he could not
claim for wages in consideration of his services. It was suggested
that the breach of contract could only be the subject of a cross-action;
but the alleged breach of contract on his part seems to go to the
whole consideration for the wages. We must treat the demurrer as
if the action were brought for the wages only, and to avoid circuity of
action it may well be considered that this action should be barred,
so as to prevent an unjust advantage in this action, and to put an
end to further litigation, rather than that the plaintiff should be
allowed to recover wages when he had refused to serve, and that
another action should be brought against him to recover them back.
Therefore, upon the demurrer to the fourth plea, we give judgment
for the defendant. Then as to the rule for entering the verdict on
the fourth count : the verdict was given for the plaintiff on the fourth
count, and this was a rule to set the verdict aside, and to .enter it
on that count for the defendant. Whether, when issue is joined on
such a plea, a want of ability to do an act proves, in point of law,
a want of readiness and willingness, depends on whether this want
of ability is necessarily a breach of the contract to perform a condition precedent, or the consideration for the promise sued on. In
an action for not adopting goods purchased, issue being joined on a
plea that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to deliver them,
the defendant would be entitled to the verdict, on proof that the
plaintiff never was in possession of the goods he undertook to deliver.
But looking at the nature of the contract sued on in the action, we
think that want of ability to serve for a week would not of -necessity
be a;. answer to a claim for a week's wages. In truth, the plaintiff
was ready and willing to serve, or had been able to do so, and was
only prevented serving during the week by the visitation of God,
the contract to serve never having been determined. That leads to
the consideration of the following question, which was reserved at
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the trial-whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff was entitled
to recover? The agreement is of a very peculiar nature: that the
plaintiff should serve the defendants in the capacity of a brewer,
and teach them to brew; that they were to pay the plaintiff 201. on
the execution of the agreement; to find him a house; to supply him
with coals for ten years, and to pay him the weekly sum of 21. lOs.
during the said term. We concur in the observations of my brother
Willes in Hfarmer vs. Cornelius, that if the plaintiff, from unskillfulness, had been wholly incompetent to brew, or by the visitation
of God had become, from paralysis or any other bodily illness, permanently incompetent to act in the capacity of a brewer to the
defendants, we think the defendants might have determined the
contract. He could not be considered incompetent by illness of a
temporary nature; but if he had been struck with disease, so that
he could not have been expected to return to his work, we think
the defendants might have dismissed him and employ another brewer
in his stead. Instead of being dismissed he returned to service; and
the defendants, when he had been restored to them, employed him
and paid him as before. At the trial the defendant's counsel admitted that the contract was not rescinded. The contract being in force,
we think that there was no suspension of the weekly payment by
reason of the plaintiff's illness, or inability to work. It is allowed
that, under this contract, there could be no deduction from the
weekly sum in respect of his being disabled by illness from brewing
one day, or week; and while the contract remained in force, we see
no difference between his being disabled for a day, or a week, or a
month. Upon the whole, therefore, we think that the verdict
obtained by the plaintiff ought not to be disturbed, and that the rule
granted for that purpose ought to be discharged.
Rule dischlarged-Judymentfor the defendant on the demurrer.

